Autor: SvenMeyer 21.12.13 - 16:08
Ist schon seit über 5 Jahren bekannt .... hätte man schon längst raus werfen oder (jeder selber) sicher stellen können, dass es nicht genutzt wird.
Did NSA Put a Secret Backdoor in New Encryption Standard?
By Bruce Schneier
November 15, 2007
"But today there's an even bigger stink brewing around Dual_EC_DRBG. In an informal presentation (.pdf) at the CRYPTO 2007 conference in August, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson showed that the algorithm contains a weakness that can only be described as a backdoor.
This is how it works: There are a bunch of constants -- fixed numbers -- in the standard used to define the algorithm's elliptic curve. These constants are listed in Appendix A of the NIST publication, but nowhere is it explained where they came from.
What Shumow and Ferguson showed is that these numbers have a relationship with a second, secret set of numbers that can act as a kind of skeleton key. If you know the secret numbers, you can predict the output of the random-number generator after collecting just 32 bytes of its output. To put that in real terms, you only need to monitor one TLS internet encryption connection in order to crack the security of that protocol. If you know the secret numbers, you can completely break any instantiation of Dual_EC_DRBG."
||SvenMeyer | 21.12.13 - 16:08|
||gschmitt | 21.12.13 - 16:22|
||Alexspeed | 21.12.13 - 21:32|
||Anonymer Nutzer | 22.12.13 - 18:10|